DaJudge
April 23rd, 2008, 02:51 PM
VIRGINIA v. MOORE (No. 06-1082)
Web-accessible at:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-1082.ZS.html (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-1082.ZS.html)
Argued: January 14, 2008 -- Decided: April 23, 2008 Opinion author: Scalia
========================================================
Rather than issuing the summons required by Virginia law, police arrested
respondent Moore for the misdemeanor of driving on a suspended license. A
search incident to the arrest yielded crack cocaine, and Moore was tried on
drug charges. The trial court declined to suppress the evidence on Fourth
Amendment grounds. Moore was convicted. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme
Court reversed, reasoning that the search violated the Fourth Amendment
because the arresting officers should have issued a citation under state
law, and the Fourth Amendment does not permit search incident to citation.
Held: The police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they made an
arrest that was based on probable cause but prohibited by state law, or
when they performed a search incident to the arrest. Pp. 3-13.
(a) Because the founding era's statutes and common law do not support
Moore's view that the Fourth Amendment was intended to incorporate
statutes, this is "not a case in which the claimant can point to a 'clear
answer [that] existed in 1791 and has been generally adhered to by the
traditions of our society ever since,' " Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S.
318 . Pp. 3-5.
(b) Where history provides no conclusive answer, this Court has analyzed a
search or seizure in light of traditional reasonableness standards "by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U. S. 295 . Applying that methodology, this Court has held that when
an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor
crime, the arrest is constitutionally reasonable. Atwater, supra, at 354.
This Court's decisions counsel against changing the calculus when a State
chooses to protect privacy beyond the level required by the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 35 . United
States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 , distinguished. Pp. 6-8.
(c) The Court adheres to this approach because an arrest based on
probable cause serves interests that justify seizure.
Arrest ensures that a suspect appears to answer charges and does not
continue a crime, and it safeguards evidence and enables officers to
conduct an in-custody investigation.
A State's choice of a more restrictive search-and-seizure policy does not
render less restrictive ones unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional. While
States are free to require their officers to engage in nuanced
determinations of the need for arrest as a matter of their own law, the
Fourth Amendment should reflect administrable bright-line rules.
Incorporating state arrest rules into the Constitution would make Fourth
Amendment protections as complex as the underlying state law, and
variable from place to place and time to time. Pp. 8-11.
(d) The Court rejects Moore's argument that even if the Constitution
allowed his arrest, it did not allow the arresting officers to search him.
Officers may perform searches incident to constitutionally permissible
arrests in order to ensure their safety and safeguard evidence. United
States v. Robinson,414 U. S. 218 . While officers issuing citations do not
face the same danger, and thus do not have the same authority to search,
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113 , theofficers arrested Moore, and therefore
faced the risks that are "an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests
alike for purposes of search justification," Robinson, supra, at 235. Pp. 11-
13.
272 Va. 717, 636 S. E. 2d 395, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Ginsburg,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Web-accessible at:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-1082.ZS.html (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-1082.ZS.html)
Argued: January 14, 2008 -- Decided: April 23, 2008 Opinion author: Scalia
========================================================
Rather than issuing the summons required by Virginia law, police arrested
respondent Moore for the misdemeanor of driving on a suspended license. A
search incident to the arrest yielded crack cocaine, and Moore was tried on
drug charges. The trial court declined to suppress the evidence on Fourth
Amendment grounds. Moore was convicted. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme
Court reversed, reasoning that the search violated the Fourth Amendment
because the arresting officers should have issued a citation under state
law, and the Fourth Amendment does not permit search incident to citation.
Held: The police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they made an
arrest that was based on probable cause but prohibited by state law, or
when they performed a search incident to the arrest. Pp. 3-13.
(a) Because the founding era's statutes and common law do not support
Moore's view that the Fourth Amendment was intended to incorporate
statutes, this is "not a case in which the claimant can point to a 'clear
answer [that] existed in 1791 and has been generally adhered to by the
traditions of our society ever since,' " Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S.
318 . Pp. 3-5.
(b) Where history provides no conclusive answer, this Court has analyzed a
search or seizure in light of traditional reasonableness standards "by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U. S. 295 . Applying that methodology, this Court has held that when
an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor
crime, the arrest is constitutionally reasonable. Atwater, supra, at 354.
This Court's decisions counsel against changing the calculus when a State
chooses to protect privacy beyond the level required by the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 35 . United
States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 , distinguished. Pp. 6-8.
(c) The Court adheres to this approach because an arrest based on
probable cause serves interests that justify seizure.
Arrest ensures that a suspect appears to answer charges and does not
continue a crime, and it safeguards evidence and enables officers to
conduct an in-custody investigation.
A State's choice of a more restrictive search-and-seizure policy does not
render less restrictive ones unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional. While
States are free to require their officers to engage in nuanced
determinations of the need for arrest as a matter of their own law, the
Fourth Amendment should reflect administrable bright-line rules.
Incorporating state arrest rules into the Constitution would make Fourth
Amendment protections as complex as the underlying state law, and
variable from place to place and time to time. Pp. 8-11.
(d) The Court rejects Moore's argument that even if the Constitution
allowed his arrest, it did not allow the arresting officers to search him.
Officers may perform searches incident to constitutionally permissible
arrests in order to ensure their safety and safeguard evidence. United
States v. Robinson,414 U. S. 218 . While officers issuing citations do not
face the same danger, and thus do not have the same authority to search,
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113 , theofficers arrested Moore, and therefore
faced the risks that are "an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests
alike for purposes of search justification," Robinson, supra, at 235. Pp. 11-
13.
272 Va. 717, 636 S. E. 2d 395, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Ginsburg,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.