DaJudge
March 25th, 2008, 11:57 AM
...even if the President issues a Memorandum directing a State to give
effect to the decision. Long. Technical. Boring writing. Interesting result!
***************************************************
MEDELLIN v. TEXAS (No. 06-984)
Web-accessible at:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-984.ZS.html (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-984.ZS.html)
Argued: October 10, 2007 -- Decided: March 25, 2008
===============================================================
In the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.),
2004 I. C. J. 12 (Avena), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that
the United States had violated Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Vienna Convention or Convention) by failing to inform 51
named Mexican nationals, including petitioner Medelln, of their Vienna
Convention rights. The ICJ found that those named individuals were entitled
to review and reconsideration of their U. S. state-court convictions and
sentences regardless of their failure to comply with generally applicable
state rules governing challenges to criminal convictions. In Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 548 U. S. 331 --issued after Avena but involving individuals who
were not named in the Avena judgment--this Court held, contrary to the
ICJ's determination, that the Convention did not preclude the application of
state default rules.
The President then issued a memorandum (President's Memorandum or
Memorandum) stating that the United States would "discharge its
international obligations" under Avena "by having State courts give effect
to the decision."
Relying on Avena andthe President's Memorandum, Medelln filed a second
Texas state-court habeas application challenging his state capital murder
conviction and death sentence on the ground that he had not been
informed of his Vienna Convention rights. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals dismissed Medelln's application as an abuse of the writ, concluding
that neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum was binding federal law
that could displace the State's limitations on filing successive habeas
applications.
Held: Neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum constitutes directly
enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of
successive habeas petitions. Pp. 8-37.
1. The Avena judgment is not directly enforceable as domestic law in state
court. Pp. 8-27.
(a) While a treaty may constitute an international commitment, it is not
binding domestic law unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it
or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be "self-executing" and is
ratified on that basis. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314.
The Avena judgment creates an international law obligation on the part of
the United States, but it is not automatically binding domestic law because
none of the relevant treaty sources--the Optional Protocol, the U. N.
Charter, or the ICJ Statute--creates binding federal law in the absence of
implementing legislation, and no such legislation has been enacted.
The most natural reading of the Optional Protocol is that it is a bare grant
of jurisdiction. The Protocol says nothing about the effect of an ICJ
decision, does not commit signatories to comply therewith, and is silent as
to any enforcement mechanism. The obligation to comply with ICJ
judgments is derived from Article 94 of the U. N. Charter, which provides
that "[e]ach ... Member ... undertakes to comply with the [ICJ's]
decision ... in any case to which it is a party." The phrase "undertakes to
comply" is simply a commitment by member states to take future action
through their political branches. That language does not indicate that the
Senate, in ratifying the Optional Protocol, intended to vest ICJ decisions
with immediate legal effect in domestic courts.
This reading is confirmed by Article 94(2)--the enforcement provision--
which provides the sole remedy for noncompliance: referral to the U. N.
Security Council by an aggrieved state. The provision of an express
diplomatic rather than judicial remedy is itself evidence that ICJ judgments
were not meant to be enforceable in domestic courts. See Sanchez-Llamas,
548 U. S., at 347. Even this "quintessentially international remed[y]," id., at
355, is not absolute. It requires a Security Council resolution, and the
President and Senate were undoubtedly aware that the United States
retained the unqualified right to exercise its veto of any such resolution.
Medelln's construction would eliminate the option of noncompliance
contemplated by Article 94(2), undermining the ability of the political
branches to determine whether and how to comply with an ICJ judgment.
The ICJ Statute, by limiting disputes to those involving nations, not
individuals, and by specifying that ICJ decisions have no binding force
except between those nations, provides further evidence that the Avena
judgment does not automatically constitute federal law enforceable in U. S.
courts. Medelln, an individual, cannot be considered a party to the Avena
decision. Finally, the United States' interpretation of a treaty "is entitled to
great weight," Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U. S., at
184-185, and the Executive Branch has unfailingly adhered to its view that
the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable federal law.
Pp. 8-17.
(b) The foregoing interpretive approach--parsing a treaty's text to
determine if it is self-executing--is hardly novel. This Court has long looked
to the language of a treaty to determine whether the President who
negotiated it and the Senate that ratified it intended for the treaty to
automatically create domestically enforceable federal law.
See, e.g., Foster, supra. Pp. 18-20.
(c) The Court's conclusion that Avena does not by itself constitute binding
federal law is confirmed by the "postratification understanding" of signatory
countries. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U. S. 217 . There are
currently 47 nations that are parties to the Optional Protocol and
171 nations that are parties to the Vienna Convention. Yet neither Medelln
nor his amici have identified a single nation that treats ICJ judgments as
binding in domestic courts. The lack of any basis for supposing that any
other country would treat ICJ judgments as directly enforceable as a matter
of their domestic law strongly suggests that the treaty should not be so
viewed in our courts. See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U. S., at 343-344, and n. 3.
The Court's conclusion is further supported by general principles of
interpretation. Given that the forum state's procedural rules govern a
treaty's implementation absent a clear and express statement to the
contrary, see e.g., id., at 351, one would expect the ratifying parties to the
relevant treaties to have clearly stated any intent to give ICJ judgments
such effect. There is no statement in the Optional Protocol, the U. N.
Charter, or the ICJ Statute that supports this notion. Moreover, the
consequences of Medelln's argument give pause: neither Texas nor this
Court may look behind an ICJ decision and quarrel with its reasoning or
result, despite this Court's holding in Sanchez-Llamas that"[n]othing in the
[ICJ's] structure or purpose ... suggests that its interpretations were
intended to be conclusive on our courts." id., at 354. Pp. 20-24.
(d) The Court's holding does not call into question the ordinary enforcement
of foreign judgments. An agreement to abide by the result of an
international adjudication can be a treaty obligation like any other, so long
as the agreement is consistent with the Constitution. In addition, Congress
is up to the task of implementing non-self-executing treaties, even those
involving complex commercial disputes.
effect to the decision. Long. Technical. Boring writing. Interesting result!
***************************************************
MEDELLIN v. TEXAS (No. 06-984)
Web-accessible at:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-984.ZS.html (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-984.ZS.html)
Argued: October 10, 2007 -- Decided: March 25, 2008
===============================================================
In the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.),
2004 I. C. J. 12 (Avena), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that
the United States had violated Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Vienna Convention or Convention) by failing to inform 51
named Mexican nationals, including petitioner Medelln, of their Vienna
Convention rights. The ICJ found that those named individuals were entitled
to review and reconsideration of their U. S. state-court convictions and
sentences regardless of their failure to comply with generally applicable
state rules governing challenges to criminal convictions. In Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 548 U. S. 331 --issued after Avena but involving individuals who
were not named in the Avena judgment--this Court held, contrary to the
ICJ's determination, that the Convention did not preclude the application of
state default rules.
The President then issued a memorandum (President's Memorandum or
Memorandum) stating that the United States would "discharge its
international obligations" under Avena "by having State courts give effect
to the decision."
Relying on Avena andthe President's Memorandum, Medelln filed a second
Texas state-court habeas application challenging his state capital murder
conviction and death sentence on the ground that he had not been
informed of his Vienna Convention rights. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals dismissed Medelln's application as an abuse of the writ, concluding
that neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum was binding federal law
that could displace the State's limitations on filing successive habeas
applications.
Held: Neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum constitutes directly
enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of
successive habeas petitions. Pp. 8-37.
1. The Avena judgment is not directly enforceable as domestic law in state
court. Pp. 8-27.
(a) While a treaty may constitute an international commitment, it is not
binding domestic law unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it
or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be "self-executing" and is
ratified on that basis. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314.
The Avena judgment creates an international law obligation on the part of
the United States, but it is not automatically binding domestic law because
none of the relevant treaty sources--the Optional Protocol, the U. N.
Charter, or the ICJ Statute--creates binding federal law in the absence of
implementing legislation, and no such legislation has been enacted.
The most natural reading of the Optional Protocol is that it is a bare grant
of jurisdiction. The Protocol says nothing about the effect of an ICJ
decision, does not commit signatories to comply therewith, and is silent as
to any enforcement mechanism. The obligation to comply with ICJ
judgments is derived from Article 94 of the U. N. Charter, which provides
that "[e]ach ... Member ... undertakes to comply with the [ICJ's]
decision ... in any case to which it is a party." The phrase "undertakes to
comply" is simply a commitment by member states to take future action
through their political branches. That language does not indicate that the
Senate, in ratifying the Optional Protocol, intended to vest ICJ decisions
with immediate legal effect in domestic courts.
This reading is confirmed by Article 94(2)--the enforcement provision--
which provides the sole remedy for noncompliance: referral to the U. N.
Security Council by an aggrieved state. The provision of an express
diplomatic rather than judicial remedy is itself evidence that ICJ judgments
were not meant to be enforceable in domestic courts. See Sanchez-Llamas,
548 U. S., at 347. Even this "quintessentially international remed[y]," id., at
355, is not absolute. It requires a Security Council resolution, and the
President and Senate were undoubtedly aware that the United States
retained the unqualified right to exercise its veto of any such resolution.
Medelln's construction would eliminate the option of noncompliance
contemplated by Article 94(2), undermining the ability of the political
branches to determine whether and how to comply with an ICJ judgment.
The ICJ Statute, by limiting disputes to those involving nations, not
individuals, and by specifying that ICJ decisions have no binding force
except between those nations, provides further evidence that the Avena
judgment does not automatically constitute federal law enforceable in U. S.
courts. Medelln, an individual, cannot be considered a party to the Avena
decision. Finally, the United States' interpretation of a treaty "is entitled to
great weight," Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U. S., at
184-185, and the Executive Branch has unfailingly adhered to its view that
the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable federal law.
Pp. 8-17.
(b) The foregoing interpretive approach--parsing a treaty's text to
determine if it is self-executing--is hardly novel. This Court has long looked
to the language of a treaty to determine whether the President who
negotiated it and the Senate that ratified it intended for the treaty to
automatically create domestically enforceable federal law.
See, e.g., Foster, supra. Pp. 18-20.
(c) The Court's conclusion that Avena does not by itself constitute binding
federal law is confirmed by the "postratification understanding" of signatory
countries. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U. S. 217 . There are
currently 47 nations that are parties to the Optional Protocol and
171 nations that are parties to the Vienna Convention. Yet neither Medelln
nor his amici have identified a single nation that treats ICJ judgments as
binding in domestic courts. The lack of any basis for supposing that any
other country would treat ICJ judgments as directly enforceable as a matter
of their domestic law strongly suggests that the treaty should not be so
viewed in our courts. See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U. S., at 343-344, and n. 3.
The Court's conclusion is further supported by general principles of
interpretation. Given that the forum state's procedural rules govern a
treaty's implementation absent a clear and express statement to the
contrary, see e.g., id., at 351, one would expect the ratifying parties to the
relevant treaties to have clearly stated any intent to give ICJ judgments
such effect. There is no statement in the Optional Protocol, the U. N.
Charter, or the ICJ Statute that supports this notion. Moreover, the
consequences of Medelln's argument give pause: neither Texas nor this
Court may look behind an ICJ decision and quarrel with its reasoning or
result, despite this Court's holding in Sanchez-Llamas that"[n]othing in the
[ICJ's] structure or purpose ... suggests that its interpretations were
intended to be conclusive on our courts." id., at 354. Pp. 20-24.
(d) The Court's holding does not call into question the ordinary enforcement
of foreign judgments. An agreement to abide by the result of an
international adjudication can be a treaty obligation like any other, so long
as the agreement is consistent with the Constitution. In addition, Congress
is up to the task of implementing non-self-executing treaties, even those
involving complex commercial disputes.